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Abstract 
This paper analyses the EU budgetary responses to the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. The European 
Commission has proposed several changes to the EU budget as well as the establishment of new 
funding instruments. The paper explores what the announced funding consists of, what role it plays in 
policy-making and what issues it generates. Throughout these budgetary responses the search for 
flexibility has been dominant, motivated by the need to respond more swiftly to humanitarian and 
operational needs. In addition, the paper argues that beyond implementation or management, the role 
of funding is also symbolic and communicative. In light of limited competences that are difficult to 
exercise, funding represents a powerful tool enabling the Commission to shape policy-making in times 
of crisis. At the same time, the dominant search for flexibility also challenges established funding rules 
and procedures. It has furthermore led to reduced space for democratic scrutiny by the European 
Parliament.  
More profoundly, EU funding for cooperation with third countries to prevent the inflow of refugees 
and asylum seekers has monetised questions over the responsibility for these individuals. As the EU–
Turkey agreement shows, this has created a self-imposed dependence on third countries, with the risk 
of potentially insatiable demands for EU funding. This paper questions the proportionality and rule of 
law compliance of allocating funding for the implementation of this agreement. Moreover, it proposes 
that the Commission take steps to practically safeguard the humanitarian aid principles in the 
management structures of the new funding instruments, and it stresses the need for more scrutiny of 
the reconfigured funding landscape by the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors. 
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EU Budgetary Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’ 
Reconfiguring the Funding Landscape 
Leonhard den Hertog* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 93 / May 2016 
Introduction 
One of the major but under-analysed EU responses to the ‘refugee crisis’ has been its budgetary 
response. This response amounts to a partial reconfiguration of the EU funding landscape in 
migration, asylum and border policies, both internally and externally. This paper explores what 
the new funding initiatives are, what role they play and what issues they generate. 
Announcing new funding is a crosscutting element of the proposed EU plans and schemes that 
seek to ‘manage’ the inflow of asylum seekers. On the internal side, the setting up of a relocation 
scheme has been the most salient proposal, entailing amendments to the EU budget. On the 
external side, the summits with African countries in Valetta and with Turkey in Brussels led to the 
establishment of new funding instruments. In all of these initiatives, the search for ‘flexibility’ – to 
ensure quick funding responses to address humanitarian and operational needs – has been 
dominant, thereby navigating and sometimes bypassing existing rules and procedures. 
This paper argues that EU funding has been one of the European Commission’s major instruments 
for policy-making throughout the refugee crisis. The ‘emergency’ atmosphere has allowed for a 
partial re-labelling, reorganisation and re-prioritisation of the EU budget and its funding 
instruments. Furthermore, the Commission’s strategy to entice the member states to pool financial 
resources, e.g. in the Africa Trust Fund and Refugee Facility for Turkey, has had a knock-on effect 
on the budgetary priorities of member states. The continual recourse to the pledging of funding by 
the Commission can be understood as compensation for limited legal competences or those that 
are difficult to exercise over borders, asylum and migration, with respect to both the member 
states and third countries. Where policy and legal solutions are elusive for the Commission, 
funding can go a long way. The funding pledges can also be seen as effective communicative tools 
to reassure member states, third countries and the general public that ‘management’ actions and 
their ‘implementation’ are taking place. This symbolic role of funding decisions is key to 
understanding why they are presented upfront in the EU’s responses. 
The main issues emanating from this reconfiguration of the funding landscape stem from the 
dominant search for flexibility. Although this could allow for addressing pressing humanitarian 
and operational needs, it also poses challenges for existing rules and democratic scrutiny. The 
reconfiguration in times of ‘crisis’ risks leading to an instrumentalisation of EU funding for current 
priorities away from the long-term goals elaborated in the funding regulations and in the funds’ 
programming. This mainly concerns the re-prioritisation of development funding and 
humanitarian aid for ‘migration management’ purposes, and gives rise to controversial questions 
over the conditionality for EU external funding. 
                                                   
* Leonhard den Hertog is a TRANSMIC postdoctoral researcher within the Justice and Home Affairs Unit at 
CEPS. TRANSMIC is a project coordinated by Maastricht University and funded by the European 
Commission’s Marie Curie actions. It aims at contributing to the understanding of transnational migration, 
in particular by looking at the conditions for and effects of transnational migration, possibilities for the 
mobility of migrants’ rights to be enhanced, and the links between migration, citizenship and development. 
The author wishes to thank Sergio Carrera for his comments on draft versions of this paper. 
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The increased use of funding in the cooperation with third countries to achieve the stated policy 
objective of preventing the inflow of asylum seekers additionally monetises questions over the 
legal responsibility for asylum seekers. This is arguably the case in the EU–Turkey agreement and 
sets a problematic precedence.1 Adopting the policy objective of preventing the inflow of asylum 
seekers through outsourcing creates a self-imposed dependence on third countries. This risks 
potentially insatiable third-country requests for EU funding and hampers EU control over its 
budget. More profoundly, in as much as the agreement with Turkey itself is problematic under 
international and European law, the proportionality and rule of law compliance of the funding 
allocated for its implementation is also at stake. 
1. Funding initiatives announced 
The Commission proposed three types of responses in its communication of September 2015 on 
“managing the refugee crisis”: “operational, budgetary and legal measures”.2 Although funding 
has been given ample attention by the Commission, most of the public controversy and academic 
analysis has revolved around the operational and legal measures, such as those proposed in the 
European Agenda on Migration.3 
On the operational side, the increased activity of Frontex (the EU Border Agency) in its joint 
operations and the hotspots was presented as the building block of the EU’s management of the 
crisis.4 The role of Frontex is to be further enhanced through recent Commission proposals for a 
European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG).5 The EU military operation, EUNAVFOR MED 
Sophia, is another form of operational action presented to respond to migration flows in the 
Mediterranean.6 The EU–Turkey agreement negotiated at the European Council summits of March 
2016 requires a further operational effort, mostly led by national authorities, EU agencies and the 
Commission.7 
On the legal side, the Commission has proposed new EU law and is planning to propose more in 
the weeks and months to come. The Emergency Relocation Mechanism, which aims at covering the 
relocation from Greece and Italy of 160,000 asylum seekers to other member states, provides a 
                                                   
1 Italy has already asked for a similar agreement – see “Italy wants Turkey-style deals to return African 
migrants”, EUobserver, 5 April 2016 (https://euobserver.com/tickers/132916). 
2 See European Commission, Communication, Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate operational, 
budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 490 final/2, Brussels, 
29 September 2015(a). 
3 See European Commission, Communication, A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, 
Brussels, 13 May 2015(b). 
4 See European Commission (2015a), op. cit. 
5 See European Commission, Communication, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004, 
Regulation (EC) No. 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final, Strasbourg, 
15.12.2015(c); see also S. Carrera and L. den Hertog, “A European Border and Coast Guard – What’s in a 
name?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 88, CEPS, Brussels, March 2016. 
6 See Council of the European Union, Decision (CFSP) 2015/972 of 22 June 2015 launching the European 
Union military operation in the southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), OJ L 157/51, 
23.06.2015(a). 
7 See European Commission, “Implementing the EU–Turkey agreement – Questions and answers”, 
Factsheet, 6 April 2016(a). 
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change to the legal architecture in this field.8 Especially the relations to the Dublin Regulation and 
the other constituent parts of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) are thereby 
transformed, with more Commission proposals on this to follow.9 
Not least impressive in quantitative terms have been the budgetary responses announced by the 
Commission. Almost every new proposal and communication is marked by the pledging of 
several millions or billions of euros from the EU budget, often with accompanying requests for 
member states to mobilise funding. This has been the case for the Africa Trust Fund, the Syrian 
Crisis Trust Fund and the Refugee Facility for Turkey.10 Certainly, an emblematic example is the 
Facility for Turkey – marked by fierce negotiations with Turkey over the amount of funding to be 
made available, as well as between the Commission and the member states as to how the 
contributions to this facility should be allocated.11 The Commission reflects the importance of 
funding not only in the official policy communications, but also in its outputs meant for public 
relations,12 underlining the crucial nature of funding in the governance of the refugee crisis. 
Before exploring the roles and difficulties of the pledged EU funding, Table 1 presents the most 
important initiatives that have been announced. The table only includes the activities that have 
been presented as new initiatives by the Commission. 
Table 1. EU funding newly announced in response to the refugee crisis (€ million) 
Initiative Funding source Period EU budget (€ million) 
EU Regional Trust Fund in 
Response to the Syrian 
Crisis – the ‘Madad Fund’ 
European Neighbourhood Fund 
(ENI), Instrument for Pre-
Accession (IPA II), member 
states, other donors 
Until 2019 500 (+500 from 
member states, other 
donors) 
EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for stability and addressing 
the root causes of irregular 
migration and displaced 
persons in Africa (launched at 
the EU–Africa Valetta Summit) 
European Development Fund 
(EDF), Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI), ENI, 
Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP), 
Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund (AMIF), 
Internal Security Fund (ISF), 
humanitarian aid, member states, 
other donors 
Until 2020 1,800 (+1,800 from 
member states, other 
donors) 
                                                   
8 See Council of the European Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ L 248/80, 
24.09.2015(b). 
9 See European Commission, Communication, Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System 
and enhancing legal avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197 final, Brussels, 6 April 2016(b). 
10 See the Agreement establishing the European Union emergency trust fund for stability and addressing the 
root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, and its internal rules, between the 
European Commission and Spain, 2015; see also the Agreement establishing the EU Regional Trust Fund in 
response to the Syrian crisis, ‘the Madad Fund’, and its internal rules between the European Commission 
and Italy, 2015; and also European Commission, Decision on the coordination of the actions of the Union and 
of the member states through a coordination mechanism – the Refugee Facility for Turkey, C(2015) 9500 
final, Strasbourg, 24 November 2015(d). 
11 See Council of the European Union, “Refugee facility for Turkey: Member States agree on details of 
financing”, Press Release, 25/16, Brussels, 3 February 2016(a). 
12 See European Commission, “EU budget for the refugee crisis”, Brussels, February 2015(e). 
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Increased humanitarian aid  Humanitarian aid 2016 +445 
Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey (linked to the EU–
Turkey agreement) 
DCI, IPA II, ENI, IcSP, 
humanitarian aid, partly through 
the EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
Until 2017 1,000 (+2,000 from 
member states, + a 
possible 3,000 by 2018) 
Emergency funding for the 
AMIF and ISF 
EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
2015, 2016 +173 for 2015 
+464 for 2016 
Increased non-emergency 
AMIF and ISF budget 
EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
2016 AMIF asylum +190 
AMIF return +38 
ISF borders +82 
Increased Frontex budget EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
2015, 2016 +133 
Increased budget for the 
European Asylum Support 
Office 
EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
2015, 2016 +10 
Increased Europol budget, 
and setting up the European 
Migrant Smuggling Centre 
EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
2015, 2016 +4.25 
Provision of emergency 
support within the EU 
First 100 from AMIF, 2016 Permanent 
Council 
Regulation 
700 (until 2018) 
Emergency Relocation 
Mechanism, partly diverted 
to the resettlement of 
Syrians from Turkey  
AMIF, EU budget amendment: 
flexibility instruments and 
redeployment 
2015, 2016, 
possibly 
longer 
780 
Distribution of dairy 
products as part of the 
response to the 
humanitarian crisis 
EU budget amendment: 
agriculture and rural 
development 
2016 30 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
2. Understanding the numbers 
Some caveats should be expressed as regards these communicated numbers. 
2.1 Funding periods 
It should be underlined that these numbers concern amounts that will not be spent immediately, 
but will be spread over a number of years to come. For example, the EU–Africa Trust Fund is set 
up for the period until 2020 – as defined in its constitutive agreement (see Table 1 above).13 Similar 
multi-year arrangements apply to the Syria Trust Fund and the Refugee Facility for Turkey. Such 
long-term funding pledges may not translate into actual implementation, as the political priorities 
of the day can divert funding away to new areas. An example of this is the funding foreseen for the 
                                                   
13 See the Agreement between the European Commission and Spain (2015), op. cit. 
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160,000 relocations from Greece and Turkey. As implementation of the relocation scheme began to 
fall short of expectations,14 and the EU–Turkey agreement was concluded, funding for 54,000 
individuals to be relocated started to be diverted to the ‘one-for-one’ resettlement programme of 
Syrian nationals from Turkey.15 This means that in budgetary terms, the Commission’s 
commitment to the relocation scheme is faltering. Several other amounts – such as the increased 
funding for the AMIF and ISF or for the agencies16 – may or may not involve structural increases. 
2.2 Budget appropriations 
Linked to the observation about funding periods, the amounts that have been announced do not 
all immediately translate into corresponding amounts in the EU budget. Some of the amounts 
announced surface in the 2015 and 2016 EU budgets (as proposed and amended several times), 
only partially as ‘commitment appropriations’ and even more limited as ‘payment appropriations’. 
The former concern those budgeted amounts that can be legally committed in the budget year, the 
latter those that are budgeted actually to be transferred to a third party to fund implementation. In 
other words, some of the communicated amounts are not yet reflected in the EU budget, as 
funding that will be spent on implementation.17 Yet this could start to materialise as payment 
appropriations in the annual budgets to follow. 
2.3 Re-labelling and redeployment 
Although the announcements could suggest that the initiatives concern ‘new’ EU funding, such 
funding either represents a reorganisation or re-labelling of existing EU funds or a shift within the 
EU budget whereby amounts are “redeployed” among budget headings and from “flexibility 
instruments”.18 Table 1 above demonstrates these different options for the initiatives listed. Several 
of the amounts come from the emergency or flexibility mechanisms foreseen in the general EU 
budget structure or in the respective structures of the funds. As can be seen in the funding source 
column in the table, the Refugee Facility for Turkey is a ‘coordination mechanism’ that will 
attempt to coordinate the amounts to be spent under several existing EU funds and member states’ 
contributions.19 This entails the facility requiring regular meetings to enable such coordination. 
Concerning the EU budget contribution, however, it does not include funding that could not 
                                                   
14 For the latest numbers on the state of play, see European Commission, Member States’ support to 
Emergency Relocation Mechanism, communicated as of 7 April 2016(c) (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-
_relocation_en.pdf). 
15 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision amending Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 
22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of 
Italy and Greece, COM(2016) 171 final, Brussels, 21 March 2016(d). 
16 These increases have so far been included in the EU budgets for 2015 and 2016 – see European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, Definitive Adoption (EU, Euratom) 2015/1769 of amending budget no. 
5 of the EU for the financial year 2015, OJ L 261/80, 07.10.2015; see also European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union, Definitive Adoption (EU, Euratom) 2016/150 of the EU’s general budget for the 
financial year 2016, OJ L 48/1, 24.02.2016. 
17 For an example of the difference between commitment and payment appropriations, see European 
Commission, Amending letter no. 2 to the draft general budget 2016 – Updating of the estimated needs for 
agricultural expenditure and fisheries; Managing the refugee crisis: Immediate budgetary measures under 
the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 513 final, Brussels, 14 October 2015(e), p. 13. For a similar 
situation, see European Commission, Draft amending budget no. 7 to the general budget 2015 – Managing 
the refugee crisis: Immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 
485 final, Brussels, 30 September 2015(f). 
18 Ibid. 
19 See European Commission (2015d), op. cit. 
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already be budgeted under instruments that could benefit Turkey and its refugee reception 
capacities. By contrast, the trust funds involve transferring funds from existing EU funds into 
separate bank accounts – from that moment falling under the trust fund management structures.20 
This funding is thus reorganised or re-labelled. 
It remains to be seen whether the expected or pledged member state contributions will materialise 
in the months and years to come. Currently, the contributions of several member states to the 
different trust funds and the Refugee Facility for Turkey have not yet been committed, let alone 
transferred.21 For the Refugee Facility for Turkey, the contributions of the member states – as 
indicated in the contribution certificates – will be channelled through existing EU funds, 
approximately two-thirds through the IPA II and one-third through humanitarian aid.22 
2.4 Double-counting 
Lastly, it should be noted that there is a fair amount of double-counting in the numbers presented. 
It is possible that funding spent through the Syrian Crisis Trust Fund and spent in Turkey will also 
count towards the numbers included under the Refugee Facility for Turkey.23 Some of the 
humanitarian aid announced, e.g. going to the World Food Programme and the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, may also be counted towards the Refugee Facility for Turkey. As also 
indicated in the table, the first €100 million for “emergency support within the Union” is to be 
funded from the increased AMIF funds,24 highlighting that the amounts presented in the table 
cannot simply be added up to give a comprehensive picture. 
3. The roles of funding beyond implementation 
The broadly assumed role of funding is that it enables the implementation of policy and 
operational measures. In the course of the refugee crisis, the Commission has proposed funding at 
different points in time to address operational and humanitarian needs. This is the case, for 
example, with the recently proposed instrument for internal emergency support, which is partly 
envisaged to address the needs of the asylum seekers finding themselves in Greece after the de 
facto closing of the northward route through the Western Balkan countries.25 This role of enabling 
the implementation of action is thus crucial in helping to address the perceived pressing needs, but 
it is not the only role. Additional roles are highlighted in this section. 
3.1 Implementation and communication 
Exactly because of the assumed strong link between funding and implementation, pledging 
funding serves the crucial symbolic and communicative role of conveying the message that the 
                                                   
20 See in more detail, V. Hauck, A. Knoll and A. Herrero Cangas, “EU Trust Funds – Shaping more 
comprehensive external action?”, ECDPM Briefing Note, No. 81, European Centre for Development Policy 
Management, Maastricht, November 2015. 
21 See, e.g. European Commission, Annex 7 to the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of implementing the priority actions under the European 
Agenda on Migration – Member States’ pledging to Trust Funds – State of Play table, COM(2016) 85 final, 
Brussels, 10 February 2016(f). 
22 Derived from an interview with an official of DG NEAR, European Commission, April 2016. 
23 This is also indicated by the European Commission – see Preamble 12, European Commission (2015d), op. 
cit. 
24 See European Commission, Draft amending budget no. 1 to the general budget 2016 – New instrument to 
provide emergency support within the Union, COM(2016) 152 final, Brussels, 9 March 2016(g). 
25 See European Commission, “EU provides €83 million to improve the conditions for refugees in Greece”, 
Press Release, IP/16/1447, Brussels, 19 April 2016(h). 
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‘crisis’ is being ‘managed’.26 Whereas legal and political plans are often seen as fraught with 
hurdles – such as finding consensus among member states or with third-country governments – 
funding announcements convey a message of ‘true’ commitment to managing a problem. The idea 
that spending money conveys one’s real priorities on the ground beyond policy texts – whether 
that idea is justified or not – renders the funding announcements extremely powerful symbolic and 
communicative tools.27 The continual pledging of funds during the refugee crisis can also be 
understood to play that role: namely, to convey the message that the Commission is managing and 
implementing initiatives to mitigate the crisis. 
3.2 Compensating for competences 
Funding is of particular relevance for the Commission in the areas of borders, asylum and 
migration, where EU competences are limited and difficult to exercise. These areas fall under 
“shared competence between the Union and the Member States”,28 entailing that the support of the 
member states is vital for legal acts to be adopted, and if required, to be transposed. It also entails 
that in many of the negotiations with third countries, within its range of competences the 
Commission has limited incentives to offer. The EU legal framework on labour migration is 
fragmented and the competence to determine the volumes of labour migration remains with the 
member states.29 Moreover, the EU’s jurisdiction on visas is restricted to the 90-day (in a 180-day 
period) Schengen visa.30 This constrains the Commission’s leverage vis-à-vis third countries. 
As the EU has limited competences, funding is crucial for the Commission to induce policy 
change. We see the phenomenon of ‘policy-making through funding’ being employed by the 
Commission throughout the refugee crisis. For example, to convince the member states to 
participate in the Emergency Relocation Scheme, the Commission has offered a lump sum amount 
per relocated asylum seeker. On the external front, the Commission has announced funding for 
third countries, in an attempt to compel them to work with the EU’s agenda. This has been clear in 
the case of Turkey and the African countries. Even though most of the funds concern a re-labelling 
                                                   
26 See European Commission (2015a), op. cit. 
27 For more on the symbolic roles of funding in literature on the political sociology of public finances, see P. 
Bezes and A. Siné, Gouverner (par) les finances publiques, Paris: Sciences Po Les Presses, 2011. 
28 See Art. 4(2.j) TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). 
29 See Art. 79(5) TFEU. The EU legal framework is furthermore fragmented between different legislative acts 
such as the Blue Card Directive, the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive and the Seasonal Workers 
Directive – see respectively, Council of the European Union, Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, OJ L 155/17, 18.06.2009; Directive 2014/66/EU of 15 May 2014 of the European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the 
framework of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157/1, 27.05.2014(a); and Directive 2014/36/EU of 26 
February 2014 of the European Parliament and Council of the European Union on the conditions of entry 
and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94/375, 
28.03.2014(b). The Blue Card Directive will be revised with Commission proposals later this year. For the 
outcomes of the public consultation, see European Commission, Summary of replies to the public 
consultation on the EU Blue Card and the EU labour migration policies for highly skilled workers, Brussels, 
6 April 2016(i). 
30 See Art. 77(2) TFEU; see also Regulation (EU) No. 610/2013 of 26 June 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No. 
562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), the Convention implementing 
the Schengen Agreement, Council Regulations (EC) No. 1683/95 and (EC) No. 539/2001 and Regulations 
(EC) No. 767/2008 and (EC) No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 182/1, 
29.06.2013. See also S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 290-
291. 
8  LEONHARD DEN HERTOG 
of existing funds, they have nevertheless allowed the Commission to present a certain degree of 
incentive to or exercise leverage with third countries. Under the ‘more-for-more’ principle – 
linking EU funding with cooperation, e.g. on return and readmission – this could also turn into 
‘less-for-less’ or conditionality.31 
3.3 Vertical and horizontal struggles 
Funding in times of crisis also figures within the context of existing vertical and horizontal 
struggles over funding and may settle some of these struggles for years to come. 
In the vertical dimension, there are struggles between the Commission and (coalitions of) member 
states over who is managing the refugee crisis and what the right approaches are. The Commission 
employs funding to name and shame the member states, as their contributions to the trust funds 
and facilities have not been forthcoming. The Commission publishes lists of member states’ 
contributions almost daily, indicating which member states are falling behind, and always 
contrasting this status with the contribution from the EU budget.32 The setting up of trust funds 
also allows for a renegotiation over who programmes, manages and monitors this pooled funding. 
By transferring bilateral funds to the trust funds, member states have to accept management by the 
Commission. In the governance arrangements of the trust funds and the Refugee Facility for 
Turkey, the Commission has the final say over the decisions taken.33 This could explain why some 
member states are not over-enthusiastic about committing their bilateral funding to the trust 
funds. As the trust funds require a minimum €3 million buy-in for donors to have a say on the 
boards and operational committees, the member states that decide not to participate would see 
their influence on the EU budget decreasing. Whereas they are involved in the existing funds’ 
committees under the comitology procedures, they will lose that influence over those EU funds 
transferred to the trust funds if they decide not to contribute €3 million, although they would have 
observer status.34 
In the horizontal EU-level dimension, the new funding structures as well as the re-prioritisation of 
EU funds – as reflected in the redeployment of the EU budget headings – implies that more 
funding is available for certain Commission directorate-generals. This is most notably the case for 
DG Home (Migration and Home Affairs), DG NEAR (European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations), DG ECHO (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection) and DG DEVCO 
(International Cooperation and Development), but also for the home affairs agencies, which have 
seen their staff levels rise throughout 2015 and 2016.35 The reconfigured funding landscape thus 
entails a reconfiguration of the organisational landscape between Commission DGs and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). However, as this reconfiguration does not increase the 
overall EU budget, this additional funding means reduced funding somewhere else. In the 
redeployment of the available funding, the Commission mostly identified available amounts in 
                                                   
31 See Council of the European Union, “Conclusions on the future of the return policy”, Press Release 711/15, 
Brussels, 8 October 2015(c); see also S. Carrera, J.-P. Cassarino, N. El Qadim, M. Lahlou and L. den Hertog, 
“EU–Morocco cooperation on readmission, borders and protection: A model to follow?”, CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 87, CEPS, Brussels, January 2016, p. 12. 
32 See, e.g. European Commission (2016f), op. cit. 
33 See, e.g. Art. 5.5.1 of the Agreement between the European Commission and Spain (2015), op. cit.; see also 
Art. 6.6.1, second para., ibid. on the possibility for the Commission alone to approve actions up to €10 
million. See also Art. 5(2), European Commission (2015d), op. cit. 
34 See Art. 6.1.2(a) of the Agreement between the European Commission and Spain (2015), op. cit.; see also 
Hauck, Knoll and Herrero Cangas (2015), op. cit. 
35 See, e.g. European Commission (2016e), op. cit. 
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several agricultural and fisheries funds, the funds allocated for the EU’s Galileo satellite project 
and in certain flexibility instruments.36 
Apart from this redeployment, the new trust funds and facility also require new coordination 
mechanisms at the EU level, as these new funding structures draw from several existing EU funds. 
Each of these existing funds have their own Commission DGs for programming and managing 
them, with the EEAS and its linked EU delegations in third countries also having a role in the 
programming exercise. Setting up the new funding structures in response to the ‘crisis’ creates the 
space to renegotiate who programmes and manages funding. For example, as the Trust Fund for 
Africa is foreseen for a period until 2020, these renegotiated structures may have a lasting effect 
beyond this crisis. 
4. The challenges of funding: The lasting impacts of flexibility 
The budgetary responses to the refugee crisis have been guided by the search for more flexibility, 
enabling EU-funded actions to be more quickly identified and implemented. The trust funds, since 
2012, have been instruments exactly allowing for more flexibility.37 In the search for flexibility 
some of the pressing humanitarian and operational priorities could be addressed more swiftly. 
Challenges with respect to accountability and existing rules and safeguards, however, have also 
ensued. 
4.1 Accountability 
First, it should be underlined that issues of accountability in EU spending on migration, borders 
and asylum are long-standing. As the European Court of Auditors has found in its subsequent 
reports on the different EU (external) funds on migration, there are serious deficiencies, such as the 
lack of audit trails, unclear or unidentified objectives, the absence of overviews of funding and 
funds not supporting human rights.38 Whether such shortcomings will be addressed by hastily 
setting up new structures is doubtful, as rules are relaxed rather than reinforced and lessons 
learned from existing programming and management may not necessarily be taken on board. 
Throughout this refugee crisis, there has also been a lack of impact assessments of the new 
‘emergency’ instruments. For example, the internal emergency support initiative was proposed 
without any impact assessment issued, invoking limited time.39 The proposal for the EBCG was 
also proposed by the Commission without the corresponding impact assessment.40 Although this 
may be justified under the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines and “Toolbox”, and 
perhaps necessary in view of the ‘emergency’ situation, impact assessments could still be done for 
                                                   
36 See, e.g. European Commission (2015f), op. cit. 
37 See Art. 187, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 966/2012 of 25 October 2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002, OJ L 298/1, 26.10.2012; see also Art. 259, European Commission, 
Delegated Regulation C(2012) 7505 on the rules of application of Regulation No. 966/2012, 29 October 
2012(a). For a helpful synthesis document, see European Commission, New Financial Regulation and its 
Rules of Application – Synoptic Presentation, Version 2, 19 November 2012(b). 
38 For the most recent, relevant, special report in this context, see European Court of Auditors, EU external 
migration spending in Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries until 2014, together with the 
replies of the Commission, Special Report No. 9/2016, Luxembourg, 17 March 2016. See also European Court of 
Auditors, The External Borders Fund has fostered financial solidarity but requires better measurement of results and 
needs to provide further EU added value, Special Report No. 15/2014, Luxembourg, 8 October 2014. 
39 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support 
within the Union, COM(2016) 115 final, Brussels, 2 March 2016(j), p. 4. 
40 See European Commission (2015c), op. cit. 
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many of the initiatives that appear poised to remain in place in the long term or even 
permanently.41 
4.2 Democratic debate 
Second, the proposed emergency and crisis funding instruments have been adopted with little 
democratic debate in the European Parliament. For some initiatives requiring the shifting of 
amounts between budget headings, the Commission submitted an amending budget to the 
Parliament and the Council for urgent approval. Increasing the budget for AMIF and ISF was 
therefore accompanied by parliamentary scrutiny, albeit in a rushed fashion.42 This differs from 
setting up a trust fund, which is done by adopting a constitutive agreement between the 
Commission and one or more member states, without it being subject to European Parliament 
consent. Also, the Refugee Facility for Turkey was adopted as a Commission Decision.43 For the 
internal emergency support, the Council adopted a regulation on the basis of Art. 122(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which figures in the chapter on “Economic Policy”.44 
As the Commission indicates, this is a new, permanent funding instrument “not limited to the 
current refugee crisis”, which could be used in the future for “other major emergencies with wide-
ranging humanitarian impacts such as nuclear or chemical incidents, terrorist or cyber-attacks and 
epidemics”.45 However necessary and good this new instrument may be in enabling humanitarian 
aid to refugees,46 it has lasting impacts beyond this refugee crisis and would hence merit 
democratic discussion on the medium- and long-term objectives and governance structures. The 
role of the Parliament in setting up these new funding instruments has thus been limited, in 
contrast to the fierce inter-institutional negotiations over, for example, the funding regulations for 
EU Home Affairs under the 2014–20 Multiannual Financial Framework.47 This lack of involvement 
of the European Parliament is not only the case in funding. As regards the EU–Turkey ‘statement’ 
itself, questions have also been raised about whether the Parliament should not be involved under 
the procedure of Art. 218 TFEU on international agreements.48 
                                                   
41 The possibility to refrain from carrying out impact assessments is foreseen in the European Commission’s 
Better Regulation guidelines and toolbox, granting a margin of discretion to the Commission to decide on 
the possibility or appropriateness of such an impact assessment – see European Commission, “Better 
Regulation Guidelines”, Staff Working Document, SWD(2015) 111 final, Strasbourg, 19 May 2015(g). 
42 See European Parliament and Council (2015), op. cit.; see also European Parliament and Council (2016), op. 
cit. 
43 See European Commission (2015d), op. cit. 
44 See Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 of 15 March 2016 on the provision of emergency support within the 
Union, OJ L 70/1, 16.03.2016(b). 
45 See European Commission, “Questions and answers: First projects of EU support to refugees in Greece 
under the new emergency support instrument”, Factsheet, Brussels, 19 April 2016(k). 
46 See European Commission (2016h), op. cit. 
47 For an overview, see A. D’Alfonso, “EU Funds for asylum, migration and borders”, Briefing, European 
Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels, 11 February 2014. 
48 Parliamentary questions were asked in the European Parliament on this issue – see European Parliament, 
“Legal nature and binding nature of the so-called ‘EU–Turkey Agreement’” 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+OQ+O-2016-
000053+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN). See also a blog post by Maarten den Heijer and Thomas Spijkerboer on 
this issue, on the EU Law Analysis website (http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2016/04/is-EU–turkey-
refugee-and-migration-deal.html). 
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4.3 Compatibility with existing regulations 
Third, questions arise about the compatibility of the newly proposed funding structures with the 
governance regimes of the existing EU funds from which they draw. Despite assurances that all 
the existing regulations will be complied with, it is sometimes unclear how these can be reconciled 
with the new instruments’ management structures and processes. This is the case for the 
compatibility of the Africa Trust Fund governance structure with that of the EDF, from which the 
largest contribution for the trust fund is drawn.49 As foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement 
concluded between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries group, local 
ownership and co-management are important principles.50 Whereas indicative programmes under 
the EDF are negotiated with the relevant third country or regional organisation, this is not 
guaranteed to occur under the Africa Trust Fund.51 
As for the Refugee Facility for Turkey, Turkey has an “advisory” status, although in practice that 
will most probably involve Turkey having a significant say over EU funding allocations.52 The 
intention to present a joint EU–Turkey strategic concept note for the ‘programming’ of the facility53 
reveals that Turkey does have an important say, if not a de facto veto. The Commission’s claim that 
all the funds under the facility will be spent in accordance with the existing EU funding 
regulations should thus not make us overlook the fact that Turkey will have an empowered say 
over the coordinated funding amounts under the facility. 
Linked to this, an important point concerns the involvement of humanitarian aid under the facility, 
as well as under the trust funds. EU humanitarian aid is governed by its own set of rules – based 
on a humanitarian needs assessment and guided by the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence under the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.54 The 
Commission Decision on the Refugee Facility for Turkey stipulates the “full respect” for this and 
excludes the otherwise “advisory” role of Turkey for “actions providing immediate humanitarian 
assistance”.55 Still, as some sort of programming of the facility is foreseen in an EU–Turkey 
strategic concept note, it is unclear whether this will include humanitarian aid.56 The very concept 
of ‘programming’ normally does not apply to humanitarian aid, as it should work on the basis of a 
humanitarian needs assessment and not on the basis of political priorities. Interviews revealed that 
even though specific decisions regarding humanitarian aid will not need a green light from the 
Turkey Refugee Facility Steering Committee, it will need to agree on the Facility’s overall 
                                                   
49 See Hauck, Knoll and Herrero Cangas (2015), op. cit. 
50 The Cotonou Agreement puts emphasis on ‘ownership’ – see the Partnership Agreement between the 
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European 
Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, OJ L 317/3, 
15.12.2000. For the latest amendments, see the Agreement amending for the second time the Partnership 
Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part and 
the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as 
first amended in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, OJ L 287/3, 04.11.2010. 
51 See Hauck, Knoll and Herrero Cangas (2015), op. cit. 
52 See Art. 5(1), European Commission (2015d), op. cit. 
53 Derived from an interview with an official of DG NEAR, European Commission, April 2016. 
54 See the Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, The European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (‘Joint Statement’), OJ C 25/1, 30.01.2008. See also Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, OJ L 163/1, 02.07.1996. 
55 See Recital 11, Art. 5(1), European Commission (2015d), op. cit. 
56 Derived from an interview with an official of DG NEAR, European Commission, April 2016. 
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priorities.57 Open questions thus remain about how in practice the facility’s governance structures 
and management processes will safeguard the specific rules applicable to EU humanitarian aid.  
4.4 The space for NGOs 
Fourth, there appears to be narrowing space for NGOs and some international organisations – 
especially the smaller and non-UN-family ones – to implement projects funded under the new 
instruments. The constitutive agreement of the Africa Trust Fund states that preference will be 
given to implementation by member states.58 Also, the expertise needed for informed 
programming and management is preferred to come from the Commission, member states and 
donors.59 Also, in the search for rapidity and flexibility, there will not be always time for engaging 
in open calls for proposals60 – something that will hinder the inclusion of implementing 
organisations not necessarily closely associated with the EU institutions. 
As regards the crucial question of whether the EU funds coordinated under the Refugee Facility 
for Turkey will be channelled mostly through NGOs providing humanitarian support to refugees 
or through Turkish official government channels, the picture is mixed. The first sets of projects 
announced include, e.g. €50 million for such organisations as the Danish Refugee Council, the 
International Organisation for Migration and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, “working in close cooperation with Turkish partner organisations”.61 Another 
€60 million is foreseen “to finance returnees” and will be “implemented by means of a direct 
agreement with the Turkish Ministry of the Interior”.62 In general, a substantial part of the funding 
available under the facility will be managed under “special measures”, providing more flexibility 
but also doing away with some aspects of open competition.63 Alongside the expectedly close 
cooperation with the agencies from the UN family, the involvement of the European Investment 
Bank may also contemplated under the Facility for Turkey, possibly where it concerns the 
financing of infrastructure projects in the education and healthcare sectors.64 
4.5 Monetising responsibility for asylum seekers 
Fifth, the increasing use of regrouping and re-labelling EU funding when seeking ‘solutions’ to the 
refugee crisis monetises questions over the responsibility for asylum seekers in international 
relations and international law. Offering funding in combination with the stated policy goals of 
limiting asylum seeker inflows and of increasing return and readmission – for which the EU is 
clearly dependent on third countries – creates a financial liability for the EU itself, as it becomes 
prone to continual third-country requests for additional funding. The request by Turkey for an 
                                                   
57 Interview with two officials, DG ECHO, European Commission, April 2016. 
58 See Art. 10 of the Agreement between the European Commission and Spain (2015), op. cit. 
59 Art. 6.6.3, ibid. 
60 See Hauck, Knoll and Herrero Cangas (2015), op. cit. 
61 See European Commission, “Facility for Refugees in Turkey: Commission delivers an additional €110 
million under the implementation of the EU–Turkey agreement”, Press Release, Brussels, 19 April 2016(l). 
62 Ibid. 
63 This was confirmed in an interview with an official of DG NEAR, European Commission, April 2016. See 
Art. 2(1), Regulation (EU) No. 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 
laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing 
external action, OJ L 77/95, 15.03.2014(c); see also, e.g. Art. 4 (allowing for grants without a call for 
proposals) of European Commission, Implementing Decision adopting a special measure on strengthening 
the response capacity of the most affected countries in the Western Balkans to cope effectively with increased 
mixed migration flows under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) for the year 2015, C(2015) 
6925 final, 7 October 2015(i). 
64 Derived from an interview with an official of DG NEAR, European Commission, April 2016. 
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additional €3 billion during the negotiations illustrates this hazard. When increasing amounts are 
allocated to such cooperation frameworks, questions about the proportionality of such allocations 
become ever more pertinent. Just as much as the EU–Turkey deal involves challenges under 
European and international rule of law frameworks,65 allocating EU funding for its 
implementation is questionable. The outsourcing under this agreement conveys the problematic 
message that responsibility for refugees and asylum seekers can be offset through funding. 
4.6 Redirection of funds towards ‘migration management’ 
Lastly, the political context of ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ creates opportunities for the redirection of 
EU funds from development objectives to ‘migration management’ objectives. For the EU–Africa 
Trust Fund, its North Africa window mostly focuses on such management, as this region is 
considered to consist of “transit countries”.66 While the trust fund thus nominally addresses the 
root causes of migration in Africa, this is not unequivocally the case for all of its regional windows. 
From the available Commission factsheet on the trust fund’s “Sahel region and Lake Chad” 
window, the adopted actions address a variety of objectives. These include development financing 
for a root-causes approach based on the questionable assumption that this will limit the ‘push 
factors’ for migration,67 and linked to this are actions around ‘migration and development’, e.g. 
mobilising the diaspora of third countries for economic development,68 as well as migration 
management actions financing national migration policies, police capacities and data exchange.69 
The inherent logic of having rapid and flexible funding allocations leads to questions over whether 
such allocations will serve the long-term development interests of third countries or rather the 
short-term security interests of the EU. In relation to this there have also been signals that some 
member states would prefer their contributions to the Africa Trust Fund to be made conditional on 
the compliance of African countries with Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, which mentions 
readmission.70 There are long-standing struggles in the EU over whether development funding can 
be made conditional on the cooperation of third countries on readmission. The October 2015 
Council conclusions on the “future of the return policy” make clear that readmission is becoming 
an increasingly prominent objective in relations with third countries. Under the more-for-more 
principle, the relationship between cooperation on readmission and other areas of relations with 
third countries has been firmly established. Funding is one of the key instruments for leverage 
mentioned in those Council conclusions on return policy.71 As highlighted in the recent special 
                                                   
65 See, e.g. S. Carrera and E. Guild, “EU–Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and 
procedural challenges”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, March 2016. 
66 See European Commission, “The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root 
causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa – Strategic Orientation Document”, North 
Africa Window, Brussels, 2015(h), starting from p. 25, (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/ 
EU–emergency-trust-fund-revised-strategy-15022016_en.pdf). 
67 In academic literature, the assumption that more development will result in less migration is questioned, 
certainly for the short and medium term – see, e.g. H. de Haas, “Turning the tide? Why development will 
not stop migration”, Development and Change, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2007, pp. 819-841. 
68 For a critical review of migration and development in Africa, see O. Bakewell, “’Keeping them in their 
place’: The ambivalent relationship between development and migration in Africa”, Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 29, No. 7, 2008, pp. 1341-1358. 
69 See European Commission, Fiche d’information, Description des nouvelles actions adoptées pour 
s’attaquer aux causes profondes de la migration irrégulière et du phénomène des personnes déplacées dans 
la région du Sahel et du bassin du lac Tchad, Brussels, 18 April 2016(m). 
70 See Hauck, Knoll and Herrero Cangas (2015), op. cit.; see also Art. 13(5.c.i), of the Cotonou Agreement 
(2000), op. cit. 
71 See Council (2015c), op. cit., pt. 12. 
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report by the European Court of Auditors on external migration funding, even though the 
Commission formally qualifies cooperation on readmission as part of ‘migration management’, 
third countries often perceive it as serving the EU’s security policy.72 In this report, the Court of 
Auditors also identified as a factor “hindering effectiveness” and limiting the “impact” the concern 
that “some projects appeared to have been more oriented towards Member States’ interests”.73 A 
further redirection of funded projects towards these interests is thus not the best way to spend EU 
external funds. 
Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that the EU budgetary responses to the refugee crisis consist of several 
new initiatives and entail a significant re-labelling, reorganisation and re-prioritisation of EU 
funding. This has partly allowed the EU to address humanitarian needs, implement operational 
plans and build support for policy and legal measures. For the Commission itself, funding has also 
been a key instrument for showing its commitment to ‘managing the refugee crisis’. Owing to the 
pervasive assumption that funding will result in implementation, announcing funding initiatives 
is proving to be a powerful symbolic and communicative tool for the Commission at this time. This 
paper also reveals that funding initiatives are not merely following political, legal and institutional 
struggles, but that funding is a part of these struggles. On both the horizontal and vertical axes of 
EU governance, reconfiguring the funding landscape is an effective way to settle struggles over 
who manages funding and to compensate for limited legal competences or those that are difficult 
to exercise over migration, borders and asylum. 
The refugee crisis has thus enabled this partial reconfiguration of the EU funding landscape, both 
internally and externally. It is crucial to recognise that this reconfigured EU funding landscape is 
here to stay, beyond this refugee crisis. For example, the trust funds have been set up to last until 
2020, the internal humanitarian emergency support is a permanent instrument, and budgeting 
history in the EU shows that the Agency budget increases, such as for Frontex, will most probably 
become structural.74 But more profoundly, there are lasting changes to the relationship between 
migration and development in EU external funding. This relationship is increasingly shaped by the 
more-for-more principle, under which third-country cooperation with the EU’s external agenda on 
migration, borders and asylum is becoming dominant.75 
The ‘experimental governance’76 that the Commission has employed in setting up and finding 
funds throughout the refugee crisis is generating issues concerning existing rules and 
accountability. This mostly concerns respect for the rules and objectives governing the existing EU 
funds that have been democratically formulated, through long and fierce negotiations on the 2014–
20 Multiannual Financial Framework. Moreover, the objectives formulated through the 
programming exercises for the different existing EU funds are partially sidelined by the new 
                                                   
72 See European Court of Auditors (2016), op. cit., p. 41. 
73 Ibid., p. 35. 
74 The budgets of Frontex can be compared over the years, for which they show a steady increase – see the 
Frontex website (http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/governance-documents/). 
75 See Carrera et al. (2016), op. cit., p. 12. 
76 For other references to experimentalist governance in the EU, see, e.g. J. Pollack and P. Slominski, 
“Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU’s External 
Borders”, West European Politics, Vol. 32, 2009, pp. 904-924; see also C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, “Learning from 
Difference: The new architecture of experimentalist governance in the EU”, European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 3, 2008, pp. 271-327; and E. Szyszczak, “Experimental governance: The open method of coordination”, 
European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2006, pp. 486-502. 
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funding structures. In addition, there is narrowing space for parliamentary scrutiny, with some of 
the new instruments and agreements escaping a debate and vote in the European Parliament. 
The implications of the current re-labelling, regrouping and re-prioritising of the various EU funds 
require closer scrutiny, by both the European Parliament and the European Court of Auditors. 
Such scrutiny should focus on the compatibility of the new funding instruments with the existing 
funding regulations, the long-term implications of this reconfiguration for the relationship 
between migration ‘management’ and development cooperation, the ownership and conditionality 
associated with the funded actions in third countries and the proportionality of the funding 
amounts in light of the objectives pursued with third countries. The latter point is particularly 
pertinent to the EU–Turkey agreement, where legitimate questions arise as to whether a potential 
€6 billion is a proportional allocation of EU funding for dealing with the ‘refugee crisis’. In light of 
the rule of law challenges posed by the EU–Turkey agreement under European and international 
law, the allocation of such an amount under this agreement is problematic. Instead of funding the 
outsourcing of refugee reception and protection to third countries, funding action to bring the EU’s 
own CEAS up to standard would constitute a more forward-looking and autonomous response. 
Recommendations 
On the basis of the analysis above, this paper proposes the following policy recommendations: 
1. The Commission and the member states should further increase the necessary spending to 
address humanitarian needs, in line with the principles guiding EU humanitarian aid. The 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid is leading in this regard, stipulating the 
fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
As acknowledged in the European Consensus, humanitarian aid should not become a “crisis 
management tool”.77 Where the trust funds or facilities draw on different funding sources 
including humanitarian aid, the governance and management structures should clearly isolate 
decision-making on humanitarian aid from that applicable to other funding sources. 
2. The Commission should strive to find the necessary responses as much as possible within 
the existing possibilities for flexibility and emergency in the EU budget and in the different 
EU funding instruments. The existing rules already allow for flexibility and emergency 
responses, and they are democratically established and governed by accountability 
mechanisms established through decades of lessons learned. They should thus be preferred for 
any necessary emergency budgetary measures. Where setting up new funding instruments 
proves unavoidable, and especially where these also constitute medium-, long-term or even 
permanent instruments, the Commission should follow the regular procedures, such as 
carrying out ex ante and ex post evaluations (including impact assessments) on the EU’s added 
value and the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.78 
3. The Commission should avoid agreements with third countries where EU external funding 
is directly tied to limiting asylum seeker flows towards the EU. As we have seen in the EU–
Turkey agreement, this outsourcing monetises questions over the responsibility for refugees 
and asylum seekers under international law. It also risks greater and potentially insatiable 
third-country demands for EU funding. The proportionality and the rule of law compliance of 
these funding allocations and of the agreement itself are at stake. 
4. The European Parliament should ensure further democratic scrutiny of the budgetary 
measures taken. Parliament’s role has sometimes been limited regarding these budgetary 
measures, but it has tools available for further scrutiny. For example, the discharge procedure 
                                                   
77 See the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (2008), op. cit., pt. 15. 
78 See Arts. 30(4) and 140(2.f) of the European Parliament and Council (2012), op. cit. 
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(Art. 319 TFEU) should be fully exploited by the Budgetary Control Committee for ex post 
democratic scrutiny.79 Although the Parliament considers the Syrian Crisis and Africa Trust 
Funds and the Refugee Facility for Turkey “neither inside nor outside the EU budget”,80 the 
discharge procedure for the existing, contributing EU funds could be a powerful tool. A 
particular area of attention should be the indirect management of EU funds by Turkish 
governmental entities under the Turkey Facility. The Parliament should also focus on the 
discharge for the EU agencies that have received budget increases, most notably Frontex and 
its likely successor, the EBCG. 
5. The European Court of Auditors should ensure rigorous auditing of the reconfigured 
funding landscape. As the Court’s special reports have proven valuable in the past, the Court 
should issue a special report with a comprehensive analysis of the different existing and new 
instruments, concentrating on the compliance of the latter with existing rules and on whether 
they perform better than existing funding instruments. In the annual statement of assurance on 
the EU budget, the Court should also prioritise scrutiny of these budgetary changes. For the 
funds under shared management, such as the AMIF and the ISF, the Court should pay special 
attention to the quality of the member states’ audit and control procedures. 
  
                                                   
79 For more detail, see A. D’Alfonso, “Discharge procedure for the EU budget – Political scrutiny of budget 
implementation”, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels, April 2016. 
80 See European Parliament, Resolution ROJ L 298/1 on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2017 
budget – Section III, 2016/2014(BUD), 9 March 2016, pt. 22. The resolution also mentions that the Parliament 
finds that the Trust Funds and the facility lack “the necessary accountability and democratic process 
prescribed by the Community method, and intends therefore to closely monitor the setting up of the funds 
and facility and their implementation; underlines that the above actions are a clear infringement of 
Parliament’s rights as an arm of the budgetary authority”. 
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